Europe, the ‘Sleeping Magnificence’ – The Atlantic

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Garry Kasparov: I used to be born on the improper aspect of the Berlin Wall. Once I visited Ronald Reagan’s Ranch Middle in Santa Barbara, California, in 2016, they’d a giant piece of the wall Reagan helped tear down on show. I joked that I didn’t acknowledge it as a result of I had solely seen the opposite aspect.

Again in 1987, I used to be talking at an occasion in West Germany, and I informed those that I used to be positive that the collapse of the Berlin Wall was inevitable and would occur very quickly. They checked out me like, Okay, that’s loopy. However he’s younger, 24, and he’s only a chess participant. What does he know? And so they stopped listening. This was earlier than Ronald Reagan’s well-known “tear down this wall” speech in Berlin, which was round a month later.

One other well-known 4 phrases from a U.S. president additionally involved Berlin. President Harry Truman stated We keep in Berlin, to vow that U.S. forces would shield and provide West Berlin throughout Stalin’s siege of the town in 1948: the well-known Berlin airlift. To not put myself within the firm of U.S. presidents, however I used to be impressed by Reagan and Truman in my very own Berlin speech at Aspen Institute on October 14th, 2015.

I titled it “4 Phrases to Change Historical past.” I stated, “We should do not forget that societies would not have values. Individuals have values. If we wish our values to succeed, we should shield the individuals who maintain them wherever they’re, whoever they’re. And if I’ll end with my very own 4 phrases right here at present: Struggle for our values.”

From The Atlantic, that is Autocracy in America. I’m Garry Kasparov.

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My visitor is Mathias Döpfner, becoming a member of me from Berlin. He’s a journalist who’s now the CEO of the multinational media and expertise firm Axel Springer. He leads dozens of publications in lots of international locations, together with Politico and Enterprise Insider in the US and Bild and Die Welt in Germany, amongst many others. He’s German, and it’s a German perspective I used to be after from him. Many round Europe and the world are ready for Germany to guide. So will it?

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Kasparov: Hi there, Mathias. Thanks very a lot for becoming a member of our program.

Mathias Döpfner: Hi there, Garry.

Kasparov: Fast query. Are you at your workplace now?

Döpfner: Completely, at my workplace in Berlin.

Kasparov: So I need to let the listeners know that this workplace, that was constructed by the founding father of your organization Axel Springer, if I’m appropriate, in 1966, it’s actually subsequent to the previous Berlin Wall that divided—bodily divided—the free and unfree world again through the Chilly Struggle. So it was standing on the sting of democracy and autocracy. Not anymore, now. However to not put too nice a degree on it: It’s exactly what this present is about. So from this perch, inform me—what do you see as a principal menace to democracy in Europe? And what’s Europe’s place on this ever-changing world at present?

Döpfner: Yeah; thanks, Garry. So sitting right here in our sort of historic headquarters constructing, it’s a golden skyscraper proper on the fringe of the previous wall and dying strip. Simply as an example that: After we actually cross the road to be able to get to the brand new a part of our headquarters, we cross a row of cobblestones, and these cobblestones are marking precisely the spot the place the wall was once. So this constructing actually was constructed as a lighthouse of freedom, because the founder known as it. It turned out to be the brand new middle of a reunified Berlin and a reunified Germany, with loads of euphoria round the concept that freedom prevails, the open-society mannequin prevails.

And in the meanwhile it appears fairly completely different, and it appears completely different from a factual base. In case you examine the outcomes of Freedom Home evaluation and different comparable analyses of the state of freedom, you then see a freedom recession globally for a few years. There’s by no means been such a big downgrading of previously free international locations to partially free and previously partly free international locations to unfree. But additionally a lot of the centrist democracies are in comparatively weak form, whereas autocratic authoritarian techniques fairly systematically obtain their targets and acquire floor.

So it’s fairly a difficult time for the open-society mannequin. And on high of that, now we have inner points. I feel we must always not solely take a look at the exterior threats and the autocrats and dictators, we also needs to take a look at ourselves and what we have to do in a different way to be able to succeed.

Kasparov: Agreed. So let’s look deep inside. Let’s begin with Germany. So 35 years in the past there was a reunification. Many believed, , it will be past our wildest desires and it will by no means occur. It did occur. Has unification occurred in minds in addition to geographically and politically?

Döpfner: Nicely, Garry, I’m not a diplomat, so I communicate very brazenly. Additionally if it’s about my very own nation. I bear in mind very properly when the wall got here down. A distinguished writer right here in Berlin, Wolf Jobst Siedler, stated it’s going to take at the least a era till we’ll see actual integration of mindset, and till we see actual unification psychologically and mentally. I believed this was completely exaggerated, that it was going to be a query of two, three, 5 years. It’s now greater than 1 / 4 of a century, and nonetheless there’s fairly a big divide. There may be nonetheless an East and West Germany, and also you see that on many ranges additionally politically. On the identical time, we additionally should realistically see that every one collectively—with regard to administration and the economic system—the reunification was successful and went properly, and there’s a lot of prosperity. And if you happen to go to the East German cities and examine them, how they seem like 30 years in the past—uncomparable. And there’s a lot progress and wealth and optimistic growth that we also needs to not be too adverse about it. We must be additionally a bit grateful.

On the third degree, and that I feel is an important one, Germany has developed, for a lot of varied causes, a level of complacency that I discover an increasing number of harmful. And I feel now we have to essentially take that as a warning name to do issues in a different way. And right here, after all, there’s loads of hope with regard to the brand new authorities that’s in place and that would, with robust management, clear up the issues—most significantly, the issue of an financial turnaround. And with regard to migration, we additionally want a really important shift conceptually and with regard to execution. I feel these are the 2 most vital matters, however that requires actually daring selections in management.

Kasparov: After unification, Germany has develop into the most important nation in Europe, and it’s a driving engine of the European Union. However contemplating the, historic, name it liabilities or historic baggage, so, is Germany prepared now—after so a few years, 80 years for the reason that finish of World Struggle II—is Germany prepared to beat this sense of historic guilt and to develop into a optimistic pressure to take a lead?

Döpfner: That’s a really fascinating query, Garry. As a result of really I feel this part of German historical past through the Third Reich, the Holocaust, and every little thing that led to this unparalleled horrors have deeply traumatized the nation and in a approach discredited the time period management and the concept of management and even the concept of excellence, to a sure diploma. The unlucky misunderstanding of this chapter of German historical past is that not solely you need to by no means be concerned in any type of army battle; pacifism is a naive concept. The second horrible misunderstanding is that management and excellence is nearly one thing adverse. It associates with Germany wants to guide the world and must dominate the world. And the irony is that just about everyone in Europe and in your entire world is ready for German management and thinks Germany wants to guide it—wants to guide Europe along with different international locations. And that leads me to the second ingredient of your query. Can we overcome the traumas? Hopefully not within the sense that we neglect about it. I feel what occurs ought to by no means be forgotten and we must always study from that. However we must always study the precise classes.

And the precise classes are all the time: Do every little thing to defend the free-and-open-society mannequin. And if we lead with good intentions and within the spirit of partnership along with others, then I feel that’s the most credible and probably the most profitable mindset. I feel aside from a proper worth set and system of coordinates, an important factor that the brand new German chancellor must show and must have is braveness. To maneuver quick, to behave and never solely communicate, and to essentially sort out the 2 largest priorities: economic system and migration.

Kasparov: Yeah, I consider one among Winston Churchill’s well-known phrases: that no success is last, no failure is deadly, what counts is the braveness to proceed. As a result of he has challenges each domestically and internationally. So that you talked about economic system and migration. Now, do you take into account power independence as part of the economic system?

Döpfner: Very massive problem. Right here, the elephant within the room is nuclear power. Will this authorities return to nuclear energy crops? That’s the massive query that everyone is asking in the meanwhile in Germany, as a result of an power coverage that’s primarily based on windmills or solely photo voltaic is just not going to unravel the issues and isn’t going to offer the power that you just want, additionally with regard to excellence in synthetic intelligence, so—

Kasparov: However allow us to once more remind our viewers that Germany made the choice to stroll away from nuclear power. What, again in 2011, sure?

Döpfner: Yeah, I bear in mind. I can share an anecdote with you. I bear in mind very properly. I used to be invited to the Russian Embassy by the Russian ambassador with a gaggle of editors of Axel Springer for lunch. And it was a coincidence that the lunch occurred on that very day, and every particular person had a glass of vodka on the desk. And earlier than we began, the ambassador was elevating the vodka glasses and stated, Let me cheer to the German chancellor. The choice to drop out of nuclear power might be superb for Russian power and for the Russian economic system. And other people regarded slightly bit irritated and principally thought it’s a joke, however then they realized it was the—

Kasparov: It was best reward to [Vladimir] Putin.

Döpfner: Proper, precisely.

Kasparov: As a result of that made Russia the only real provider or this main provider of power to Germany—and through Germany to many different European international locations.

Döpfner: I personally suppose it was one of the crucial irresponsible selections of German governments in postwar historical past, as a result of not solely did it create the largest harm to the German economic system and the German power sector, however extra importantly, it has principally strengthened and financed the Putin that now we have to cope with since then—and the Putin who then invaded Crimea and who then invaded Ukraine. And the cash is the principle useful resource that has funded that warfare. It’s fairly a tragic case, and it reveals once more why commerce coverage, financial coverage, is so immediately intertwined with geopolitics and safety politics. And that’s why this entire determination to drop out of nuclear power is approach, approach larger than only a subject within the context of coalition eventualities or power insurance policies. It goes approach past it.

Kasparov: Now, the German political map at present—once more, I’m sufficiently old to recollect when Germany was in a traditional two-party system, , social Democrats on the central left, and Christian Democrats on the precise. Now it’s a multitude. However the hazard is that we may see in Germany as in every single place, each in America and Europe, the rising strengths of the radicals on the far left and much proper. So the German political map at present has a large number of MPs and rising energy of each AfD—Various für Deutschland, far proper—and in addition two far-left teams. So how do you describe this new—the political realignment? And the way harmful is the specter of these mixed assaults on democracy from the far proper and much left? Clearly the far-right group is far larger. They received greater than 20 % within the final elections, and I feel now, their recognition degree stands at almost 25 %. So simply give us just a bit little bit of a way of this very dispersed political discipline. So the political map is sort of messy for the standard two-party system.

Döpfner: This phenomenon, I feel it’s merely the results of failed and unsuccessful centrist insurance policies and the dearth of credibility of centrist political leaders. So if we sort out that drawback, we must always first take a look at what did the centrist events, what did the older events, the political institution do improper? And why really feel folks, the necessity to search for alternate options and shift extra to the extremes? Why are they seduced by the straightforward options? And I feel that can also be a fairly international phenomenon the place the extremes are getting stronger. The middle has made errors and may begin with self-criticism. Now, concretely to Germany, each extremes are very harmful and have some concepts which might be very anti-constitutional and notably harmful with regard to geopolitics and the way forward for open societies.

Kasparov: Yeah. I need to simply speak a bit extra about AfD, Various für Deutschland. As a result of the opposite far-right teams and events like in France—Marine Le Pen’s—or Nigel Farage [and the] Reform Get together in Nice Britain—they refuse to cope with AfD. They consider it’s too far proper and it has an open nostalgia for Nazi Germany. So are you able to inform us extra in regards to the nature of this social gathering and the menace it may signify to German democracy and to European integration? As a result of it’s, after all, it’s towards a united Europe.

Döpfner: I feel certainly the foreign-policy ideas, the geopolitical penalties, of which might be by far the largest menace that this social gathering supplies. The admiration for strongmen and autocratic international locations—like virtually Russia, but in addition China and others—replicate a very completely different concept of society, a distinct concept of management. And in addition the implications geopolitically can be horrific, I feel, for the open-society mannequin and the world order that we’re discussing at present. That’s why I discover it notably exhausting to know why this motion is a lot extra widespread within the japanese states of Germany than within the western a part of Germany. And that’s really counterintuitive, since you ought to suppose like different Japanese European international locations—who principally skilled Soviet communism and the ruthlessness of that system—that ought to result in loads of practical and skeptical expectations with regard to future relationships with Russia, and the longer term affect of Russia or coping with China. However the reverse appears to be true. And that’s, for me, very exhausting to clarify. Actually, Garry, I’ve no very convincing clarification for that.

Kasparov: Let’s discuss sympathy to AfD not from the east, however from the west. Really the far, far west—in D.C. So it appears there are fairly just a few followers of AfD in Trump’s administration. Positively it’s J. D. Vance, who brazenly supported not simply AfD however virtually each far-right political group in Europe that was preventing within the elections to get into energy. So how do you clarify that?

Döpfner: I feel it will be notably adverse for the US, as a result of in massive components of the social gathering there’s a deeply rooted anti-Americanist strategy, a deeply rooted anti-capitalist strategy. And I’d be curious how that will play out with regard to the transatlantic relationship. I imply, simply take the very concrete request or proposal: no American weapons on German floor. That’s humorous. Putin will like that, however that’s not good for Germany. Now, possibly some folks in America might say, Nicely, that’s good for America, as a result of now we have decrease bills in that context. However I feel the worth that the US would pay in the long run for that will be huge, would go up, undoubtedly. As a result of a Putin that’s inspired by such a transfer wouldn’t cease in Ukraine. He would go additional.

Kasparov: So am I listening to you saying that with out America, with out American management, the worldwide democracy might be in peril and should collapse?

Döpfner: Sure. I feel it’s a really good however barely naive concept that now the massive historic alternative is, since America is sending loads of disturbing and stunning alerts, Europe may do it alone or may do it higher. It’s not going to work.

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Döpfner: The challenges of China, the challenges of Russia, and the challenges of Islamist dictatorships are a lot too massive to be able to be solved by Europe alone, and I’d even go that far— they’re additionally approach too massive than being solvable by the US alone.

Kasparov: We’ll be proper again.

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Kasparov: However let’s take a look at this geopolitical chess board: America, China, and naturally Russia continues to be there. So it’s a comparatively small economic system, however you could have nukes, [an] military, you could have a loopy dictator who made warfare as an engine of his energy. And what’s Europe right here? As a result of I feel one of many issues between Europe and America and now the way in which, I feel, the Trump administration is viewing Europe is—Europe is split, is simply too weak. And Germany is just not able to play the main function to unite Europe—and to make it communicate with one voice that would put Europe at this negotiating desk and make, , European opinion, European energy, to be counted. Do you consider that Europe nonetheless has its potential, once more led by Germany, to make herself related?

Döpfner: The quick reply is sure. Europe is a sleeping magnificence. It’s only a nice continent with fantastic international locations and a wonderful, most likely probably the most engaging, life-style on the planet. But it surely’s additionally sleeping. It’s sleeping as a result of it developed a really harmful diploma of complacency. Now the query is: Can that be modified? And right here, my take is extra optimistic. I feel what is occurring in the meanwhile on the planet may be very disturbing. And it may be the start of the top—it may be the start of the top of the open-society mannequin, of the concept of a free guidelines–primarily based society, of democracy, of the rule of legislation, of human rights. And we can have a really completely different world order. Now, being on the verge of that, seeing the hazards and dealing with loads of volatility in the US and loads of rigor and aggression in nondemocratic superpowers like China, I feel it has the potential to essentially be the wholesome wake-up name—the wholesome wake-up name for democracy within the open-society mannequin, and the wholesome wake-up name for Europe. After which I feel that will be a reawakening of Europe. aAnd instantly in 10 years, the world can look fully completely different. Individuals might say, Wow, what a shift of labor, excellence, know-how, worth creation to European international locations. What a distinct world the place these open societies stick collectively and construct strategic alliances within the economic system, but in addition within the discipline of protection and safety. So I really suppose we’re at a pivotal second the place each is feasible: the start of the top, or the wholesome wake-up name that begins a brand new decade, a brand new century, the place Europe performs a extra vital and a greater function.

Kasparov: You stated, I feel, sleeping magnificence. For me, that doesn’t represent any energy. So it’s principally ready for a brave prince to wake her up with a magic kiss. Is it a sleeping magnificence or a sleeping large?

Döpfner: That’s an excellent level. It’s a wonderful large, let’s name it. However in any case—

Kasparov: That’s an fascinating combination.

Döpfner It’s—in any case, we undoubtedly agree that it’s sleeping in the meanwhile, however I additionally agree along with your criticism of magnificence is just not sufficient. And I feel with the precise injection of power and ambition and aspiration, it may be a brand new participant, a brand new large.

Kasparov: Three and a half years of warfare in Ukraine. You’ll be able to hear them from Berlin. Was it not sufficient to wake Europe up? So how come that in three and a half years, Europe—Europe!—has supplied much less assist for Ukraine than North Korea for Russia? You’re nonetheless considering your subsequent strikes. You don’t need to see that Putin is at warfare with Europe. It’s a sort of hybrid warfare. He has been brazenly interfering in elections in Germany, in Romania, in France, in Britain. So in every single place. What else do it’s worthwhile to get up? And let’s once more return to Germany—can Germany simply take a lead? Three and a half years have been misplaced, so what does come subsequent?

Döpfner: To start with, Garry, I completely agree along with your evaluation. Secondly, I don’t have an excellent reply why it’s nonetheless sleeping. I wrote a textual content just a few days after the invasion in Ukraine and stated, That is now a second the place the West has to behave, the place NATO members should act. Whether or not it’s underneath Article V or not. However that is the second the place now we have to point out energy, as a result of solely energy and army deterrence is avoiding an escalation and is avoiding a much bigger and long-lasting battle. And if we don’t do this, the worth goes to be increased. I used to be criticized as a warmonger; I used to be criticized to danger a nuclear escalation. And so forth.

So from at present’s perspective, it feels fairly unhappy, as a result of I nonetheless suppose—and I’m nonetheless deeply satisfied—had we acted sooner and extra determinedly, we may have prevented a big diploma of what has occurred since then. And now we’re in a a lot worse place. Nonetheless, I feel it isn’t too late, and if you happen to simply take a share of budgets that NATO members and the West is principally investing to be able to cease Putin, it’s so minor. It’s so minimal in comparison with what Putin is investing. And that leads me to the quite simple end result: If we’d need to cease that, we may cease it. And there’s, I don’t know—it’s a mixture of opportunism and naivety. And in addition a improper narrative, that provided that we’re good to Putin and if we aren’t focusing an excessive amount of on army pressure, solely then we are able to calm him down, which is so improper. It’s misreading a lot the thoughts of virtually all totalitarian leaders, and notably of Putin, who’s principally testing the West and all the time seeing how far can he go. And the additional we let him go, the extra he’ll do, and the upper the worth goes to be. So it’s already late. It’s not too late, however we wasted loads of time.

Kasparov: Once more, realistically, so no matter we are saying about NATO and its historic function, the function has performed over 75 years. I imply, it’s lifeless now. It’s not functioning. And undoubtedly, the subsequent three-plus years, whereas Trump is in workplace, no one expects NATO to be what it was once—the group that we relied upon for many years. I share your optimism that, , finally there might be some sort of new alignment or realignment in European-American relations. The worldwide democracies will get collectively. However that’s sooner or later. However presently, now we have the warfare. So can Germany, in your opinion, lead this new protection alliance because the prototype for the longer term model of NATO—to guarantee that this warfare may be received, or at the least Ukraine can survive the Russian onslaught? And, what are the bounds for Germany in constructing such an alliance? How practical is it to examine the German function as an engine for this protection coalition?

Döpfner: Can Germany do this? Sure; Germany can do this. Will Germany do this is extra advanced. And right here I feel there’s one psychological motive why there’s a danger that’s not occurring. And I discussed that already. It’s historical past. It’s a bit this worry of taking army management. I imply, the world was fearing for many years, for good causes, for German army initiatives, for army ambitions, in a approach for army management. And I feel that can also be a really, very sort of poisoned floor.

And that will result in extra reluctance than we’d like, and that may very well be a motive why it’s not occurring or why it’s not occurring quick sufficient. But when I’ll, allow us to additionally not neglect the likelihood that one thing occurs that could be stunning from at present’s perspective, however psychologically not unlikely. And that’s the extra Putin performs with Trump, the extra he publicly embarrasses Trump—gaining time, not making actual concessions, not sticking to agreements, the extra Donald Trump may really feel provoked. And if Putin continues to try this, then I feel Trump may shock everyone by actually altering his thoughts fully. After which we may have a very completely different scenario, not solely psychologically, but in addition militarily.

Kasparov: Oh, I’m afraid you’re a dreamer, Mathias.

Döpfner: Perhaps I’m a dreamer, yeah. However do you actually suppose that it’s practical that Trump leaves the sphere because the loser, having been sort of outsmarted by Putin and principally saying, Okay, I resign. You received, Vladimir. I simply go away the battlefield as a loser. For me, it’s additionally exhausting to think about, merely psychologically.

Kasparov: Yeah. However Trump’s psychology, it’s simply, it’s all the time to show any failure right into a victory. Okay then; now simply going to the top of our dialog. So let’s consider what Germany may, ought to, and hopefully will do. So will Germany transfer on with the rearmament plans? So investing closely in its military-industrial advanced, constructing new weapons, and changing into a army powerhouse as soon as once more?

Döpfner: I feel the probability may be very excessive, if you happen to simply look to the sort of modifications in social conduct. Just some years in the past, folks from the weapon—from the protection business weren’t even invited to dinner events. In the present day, they’re stars of dinner events. Everyone talks to them. They’re perceived as heroes. They’re perceived as guards of freedom and democracy. So the mindset has actually essentially modified. And in addition the variety of start-ups which might be coping with drones, and coping with new applied sciences of protection, is skyrocketing. Individuals are making ready for that, and everyone sees the necessity for that. So the probability that that mindset modifications is fairly excessive.

Kasparov: So do you suppose that it’s practical that Germany may also construct its robust military that may develop into the core of this army barrier towards potential Russian aggression?

Döpfner: Mmm, that’s a protracted shot. I don’t know the way developed the willingness of German folks is to defend their nation. I feel it’s already powerful to defend our nation, and even harder to defend Europe. However possibly I’ve a barely—possibly my take is simply too adverse right here.

Kasparov: Yeah. No, but it surely’s essential to listen to—as a result of I’m afraid, , I share your pessimism right here. All these weapons, all these shells, all these drones: They aren’t too efficient with out the willpower behind it. With out manpower behind it. And it appears to me that Germany is but to cross this highway. So it’s like from West Berlin to East Berlin. So simply from this historic guilt, , from this peace-mongering to warfare actuality. Are you able to think about simply, , that as part of this coalition, Germany might develop nuclear weapons to discourage Russia?

Döpfner: Unlikely.

Kasparov: Unlikely. In order that implies that Germany will all the time depend upon different international locations, as a result of the profitable deterrence is just not—towards Russia—won’t work and not using a nuclear umbrella. So who will present the nuclear umbrella throughout Trump’s years? France, Britain? How do you suppose Germany will handle it?

Döpfner: Perhaps France and Britain will play a much bigger function. That’s a risk. However once more, I feel with out America, it’s going to be very powerful. That’s why it’s in our very very important curiosity to maintain a wholesome relationship with America, regardless whether or not we like the federal government or not. It’s an overarching paradigm, I feel, for Europe and for Germany.

Kasparov: So only a very last query. So that you simply give us the subsequent three years, only for the subsequent three years of the Trump administration: What would be the ideally suited final result? So for us to dream about 2028— from the German perspective?

Döpfner: Sturdy German management results in conceptual priorities. One is to guide Europe in army energy and help in Ukraine, in protection, to be able to restrict Putin’s aggression. That can impress the US, as a result of a stronger Europe might be taken extra severely. And a Europe that does extra for its personal protection might be extra credible as a accomplice to barter offers on different ranges.

And the second factor might be modified in Germany and in Europe. And that’s: that we attain out to America, agreeing on a mutual technique, commerce technique, towards China, defend that technique collectively on the negotiation desk. Obtain a a lot, a lot better cope with China that strengthens Europe and America. That weakens Putin, that limits China, that strengthens the democratic world. That would be the starting of a brand new, affluent period for America. America First from an American perspective, and a stronger Europe, Europe First, from a European perspective. However primarily based on mutual values excelling collectively. That may be probably the most optimistic final result that will strengthen the open-society mannequin and freedom and democracy. However Garry, truthfully, that’s the final diploma of optimism that I can develop at this stage. Let’s work on that. Let’s hope for it. However let’s not depend on it. Put together for the worst to be able to get positively shocked.

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Kasparov: Sure, we are able to put together for the worst, but it surely’s essential to have a imaginative and prescient. And thanks very a lot for laying down this optimistic imaginative and prescient, Mathias. And I hope that at the least a part of this imaginative and prescient might be realized quickly.

Döpfner: That may be one thing.

Kasparov: And to begin with is, after all, , for Ukraine A) to outlive, B) to win. And finally the Putin regime to break down and Europe to develop into an actual geopolitical participant: to get up from its sleep and to develop into, as you stated, a wonderful large on the world stage.

Döpfner: Great. I completely agree.

Kasparov: Sure. Thanks very a lot, Mathias; thanks.

Döpfner: Thanks, Garry.

Kasparov: This episode of Autocracy in America was produced by Arlene Arevalo. Our editor is Dave Shaw. Authentic music and blend by Rob Smierciak. Truth-checking by Ena Alvarado. Particular due to Polina Kasparova and Mig Greengard. Claudine Ebeid is the chief producer of Atlantic audio. Andrea Valdez is our managing editor.

Subsequent time on Autocracy in America:

Kasparov: I’m Garry Kasparov. See you again right here subsequent week.